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Inherent Rulemaking Authority Of An
Independent Judiciary
HONORABLE JAMES R. WOLF
Many state constitutions specifically grant the judiciary the power
to regulate practice and procedure within the court system.' May the
legislature assume all or part of this power by way of state constitutional
amendment, or do other sections of the federal or state constitution,
including the separation of powers provision, provide an independent
source of authority for the court system to retain primacy in this area?
While control over the court's rulemaking authority has been a source of
conflict between the legislature and the judiciary in a number of states
for many years, a lack of a uniform, national body of case law exists
defining the inherent powers of an independent state judiciary to control
practice and procedure in its system. Commentators argue that the fail-
ure to specifically define the inherent functions will result in continuing
conflict between the legislative branch and the judiciary, and constitute a
threat to the independence of the judiciary. Professor Erwin Chemerin-
sky described the problem in stating:
When it comes to judicial independence, the jurisprudence on separa-
tion of powers and due process is scarce. There are scattered opin-
ions, but little in the way of sustained development of analysis.
There really needs to be, in your opinions and our law review articles,
development of the idea when legislative actions interfere with the
essential functions of the courts. What does due process require in
terms of access to the courts? The more your opinions can develop
this, and the more our law review articles discuss this, the better the
courts can be protected from the statutory threat. 2
Does the threat of legislative usurpation of the court's rulemaking
authority justify a broader assertion of the court's inherent authority to
control practice and procedure within the judicial branch? The judiciary
faces serious considerations in determining whether to aggressively
identify and assert inherent authority in this area. This article explores
those considerations and this important issue.
The Florida Constitution grants the supreme court exclusive power
1. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); PA. CONST. art. V,
§ 10(c).
2. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing Remarks at 1998 Forum For State Court Judges, in
ASSAULTS ON THE JUDICIARY: ATTACKING "THE GREAT BULWARK OF PUBLIC LIBERTY" 139
(Rosco Pound Foundation ed., 1999).
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to "adopt rules for practice and procedure in courts."3 The Florida Leg-
islature may repeal - but not amend - court rules by a super majority
vote of both houses.4 In January 2000, the Florida Legislature passed
the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 (DPRA)5 that reduced the time
period for filing collateral postconviction motions and also dealt with
the manner in which public records requests by death row inmates
would be handled.6
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutionality of
this legislation in Allen v. Butterworth.7 In Allen, the court held that the
provisions dealing with time limitations for postconviction motions, as
well as the section addressing public records requests, violated the sepa-
ration of powers provision of the Florida Constitution.8 In reaching this
conclusion, the court determined that the provisions were a legislative
encroachment on the exclusive rulemaking power of the court.9 This
decision rests on the court's expressed rulemaking authority derived
from the Florida Constitution and the due process rights of the individ-
ual defendant.'"
During the next legislative session, an amendment to the Florida
Constitution was proposed which, among other things, allowed rules of
court to be modified or repealed by majority vote of the legislature.''
The proposal also gave the legislature the right to adopt time limits
related to challenges filed by deathrow inmates.'" Although this propo-
sal did not ultimately pass, it raised serious issues concerning the extent
to which the Florida Constitution could or should be amended to remove
the court from its primary role in managing operations and procedures of
the judiciary.
Within months, the court was again forced to consider a statute
prescribing the operation of the judiciary. In Jackson v. Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections," the court struck down a statute requiring inmates
filing civil suits and requesting indigency status to file copies of previ-
ous civil litigation that they had instituted.' 4 The court determined the
3. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
4. Id.
5. Act effective Jan. 14, 2000, ch. 00-3, 2000 Fla. Laws 4-23.
6. Id.
7. 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000).
8. Id. at 59-66.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 54 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
11. FLA. H, JOUR. 1031 (Reg. Sess. 2000) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)); FLA. S.
JOUR. 2224 (Reg. Sess. 2000) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
12. Id.
13. 790 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2001).
14. Id. at 386.
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statute to be an invalid intrusion on the court's rulemaking power and
that it interfered with the ability of the judiciary to operate due to the
large amount of copying required and the amount of paper generated.
15
Thus, the statute also violated separation of powers provisions of the
Florida Constitution.
The emphasis on the court's ability to function, as seen in Jackson,
is an apparent recognition of an independent source of powers for the
court's rulemaking authority. This independent source of authority may
arise from the concept of separation of powers or from the necessity of a
court having those powers to enable it to perform essential functions. If
so, it is a vital recognition that an independent court system has inherent
powers within the area of rulemaking which cannot be usurped.
The potential for conflict over procedural rulemaking at the state
level is not unique to Florida or death penalty issues. For example, in
1987, the Texas Supreme Court amended its civil procedure rules to
expressly overrule legislation passed a month earlier to curtail a per-
ceived problem of frivolous pleadings. 6
The extent to which the legislature may intrude on the operations of
an independent court system is also being addressed at the federal level.
In French v. Duckworth,17 the Seventh Circuit found the automatic stay
provisions 18 of the Federal Prison Litigation Reform Act unconstitu-
tional.19 According to the circuit court, the provision violated constitu-
tional separation of powers by legislatively suspending final judgments
of Article III courts because this interfered with the exclusive power of
the federal judiciary.20 The Supreme Court overturned the Seventh Cir-
cuit decision in Miller v. French,2 but reconfirmed that if Congress had
reopened or suspended an existing final judgment, the separation of
powers provisions would be violated.22
As to the Florida dilemma, new Florida Supreme Court decisions
must define the scope of the separation of powers authority identified in
Jackson. This will be vital in determining ultimate control over practice
and procedure in the Florida court system. Jackson, however, provides
little guidance.23 The scope of the separation of powers authority identi-
15. Id.
16. Bruce L. Dean, Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifying the Judiciary's Power to Promulgate
Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 139, 140-42 (1988) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
17. 178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2).
19. French, 178 F.3d at 446.
20. Id.
21. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
22. Id. at 346.
23. The supreme court held that section 57.085(7), Florida Statutes, was unconstitutional "as
2002]
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fled in Jackson may be interpreted in three ways: (1) a separation of
powers violation exists only when the legislature intrudes on the court's
expressed constitutional powers to adopt rules for practice and proce-
dure for its system and therefore, the separation of powers provision
does not necessarily constitute a separate source of authority for the
court to adopt rules; (2) the separation of powers provision is an inde-
pendent source of the court's power to adopt certain rules for performing
judicial functions, but not all procedural rules will necessarily involve
the inherent powers of the court; or (3) the separation of powers provi-
sion encompasses the entire rulemaking authority relating to rules for
practice and procedure in the court system because the power to adopt
the entire body of procedural rules is essential to an independent
judiciary.
This article will generally explore the pertinent considerations that
faces the Florida judiciary in determining the inherent authority to adopt
rules of practice and procedure for the Florida courts. Specifically, this
article will: (1) discuss the historical background concerning the
rulemaking issue; (2) discuss commentaries on judicial control over the
rulemaking process; (3) define and determine whether state courts have
inherent rulemaking powers; (4) explore if such powers in fact do exist,
why they have not been more thoroughly discussed in law review arti-
cles and case law; (5) discuss what guidance federal case law provides in
identifying these powers; (6) discuss whether differentiating the proce-
dural from the substantive is important in determining the inherent pow-
ers necessary to regulate practice and procedure in the court system; (7)
make observations concerning the choices facing the Florida court sys-
tem in how to approach future cases involving inherent power; (8) dis-
cuss examples of inherent powers in other states and Florida; and (9)
discuss criteria for identifying inherent power.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Common Law England
Prior to this century, it was widely thought that legislatures had
ultimate control over rulemaking. Courts, however, were granted signif-
icant or concurrent power to make rules, either through legislative dele-
a violation of separation of powers and as a usurpation of our exclusive rule making authority."
Jackson v. Dep't of Corr., 790 So.2d 381, (Fla. 2001). There is, however, little discussion
concerning the scope of the separation of powers provision. Much of the discussion concerns
whether the statute is procedural or substantive. Concern is raised regarding the cumbersome
procedure imposed by the legislature and its effect on the operation of the judiciary. This
discussion appears to relate to the inherent power of the court, a separation of powers issue.
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gation or by recognition of their inherent authority as a court.2 4 Roscoe
Pound, however, took issue with the idea that ultimate legislative control
over court rules constitutes a common law tradition. He argued that this
power arose in the middle of the nineteenth century during a period of
legislative omnipotence.25 Pound stated that, "[t]he common law courts
and the Court of Chancery in England had regularly exercised the rule-
making power down to the Revolution, and it was not until the New
York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848 that legislative regulation of
every detail became the fashion. '26 He further argued that the code sys-
tem had "lamentably failed" because of minute meddling and lack of
systematic planning.27 Additionally, Pound echoed Cardozo's view that.
"The legislature is informed only casually and intermittently of the
needs and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disin-
terested or systematic advice as to the workings of one rule or another,
patches the fabric here and there, and mars often when it would
mend."28
B. Colonial Courts to 1900
While Pound makes a valid argument regarding the common law
tradition in England, little evidence exists of a strong tradition of the
separation of powers in colonial courts. 29 For example, in Connecticut,
the court was merely an offshoot of the legislature and had previously
been part of the executive branch.3 ° The situations in other American
colonies were similar.3 Court independence became a theme of the
24. A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making:
A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
25. Roscoe Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34
(1952).
26. Id. at 35 n.18.
27. Id. at 31 (footnote omitted) (quoting REPORT OF THE BOARD OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, A PLAN FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF CIVIL PRACTICE 29
(1912)).
28. Id. at 32 (quoting Benjamin A. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113,
113-14 (1921)).
29. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in
Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. I, 5-7 (1975).
30. Id. at 5.
31. See Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability In State Government and the
Constitutional Requirements of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 27-28
(1998). Shane stated:
When reorganizing government just before the Revolution, the predominant concern
of Americans had been freeing legislative and judicial power from executive
control. The judiciary was not yet clearly conceptualized as a distinct branch of
government. Rather, the administration of justice was commonly conflated with the
executive power. The power of adjudication implicated the Crown fully because
colonial judges served at the King's pleasure and the Privy Council was the court of
last resort for the colonist. When the colonies turned to the first wave of new
2002]
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Framers of the United States Constitution.3" Nevertheless, the period
from the mid 1800's to the early 1900's is considered to be one of legis-
lative dominance in the area of judicial rulemaking.
C. Twentieth Century Trends
During the early 20th century, a push was led by Roscoe Pound and
others to transfer ultimate rulemaking authority to the judiciary. Since at
least 1945, the overwhelming trend has been to grant specific constitu-
tional authority for rulemaking to the judiciary.33 Where this power has
not been specifically extended by language in the state or federal consti-
tution, courts have claimed such power as part of their inherent authority
or through specific statutory delegation.
34
D. Florida Examples
Historically, Florida has followed the national trend. Prior to 1957,
there was no specific grant of rulemaking authority in the Florida Con-
stitution. At least one commentator described this period as one in
which the court made no claim of inherent authority over procedural
rulemaking and was further characterized by recurrent statutory delega-
tions of rulemaking authority to the courts.35 Another writer described
this era as one of legislative control over rulemaking.36 While these
commentators discuss this period as one of legislative primacy, it is
unclear how far the Florida Supreme Court would have allowed the leg-
islature to assume a dominant or exclusive role in rulemaking. While
the court recognized the power of the legislature to adopt rules, it never
specifically conceded that the Florida Legislature had the right to strip
the court of its inherent powers.37 For example, in Humphries v. Hester
& Stinson Lumber Company,38 the Florida Supreme Court noted that it
constitutions, their focus was on curbing the magistracy and establishing the broad
scope of legislative power. Judges were freed from the power of the governor, but
subjected in substantial manner to legislative supervision.
Id. For a contrary position, see Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (I11. 1952)
("Prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution, courts exercised complete power in the
control of their own procedure... The system became modified in this country by the adoption of
statues, whereby the legislature usurped a part of the rulemaking.").
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
33. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 5-6; see also Pound, supra note 25, at 33.
34. See Peter F. Ruben, Illinois Supreme Court's Disciplinary Authority Exclusive at Last, 83
ILL. B.J. 410 (1995).
35. Ernest Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, 32 U.
FLA. L. REV. 442, 445-46 (1980).
36. Roger A. Silver, The Inherent Power of the Florida Courts, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257
(1985).
37. See id. at 275 n.124-27.
38. 103 Fla. 1079, 141 So. 749 (1932).
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"has always been clothed with inherent power to make rules for its gov-
ernance."39 Other courts discussed limitation on the legislative assertion
of power during this period. In 1952, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
"This departure from the time honored methods of rulemaking has not
left the legislature without limitations in this field. The General Assem-
bly has power to enact laws governing judicial practice only where they
do not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary."40 As
early as 1859, the California Supreme Court stated that legislative con-
trol over the judiciary in the face of the constitutional judicial mandate is
intolerable. 4
In the post World War II era, Florida, like many other states, spe-
cifically granted rulemaking power to the judiciary by constitutional
provisions. From July 1, 1957 to 1973, article V, section 3 of the Flor-
ida Constitution read in pertinent part: "[T]he practice and procedure in
all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court. 4 2
On January 1, 1973, the present language in article V, section 2 of the
Florida Constitution became effective.43
Thus, the appropriate allocation of the power to make court rules
has been a topic of concern on both the national level and in Florida for
a number of years.44 One commentator described the struggle for power
in this area as having "a roller-coaster history as to which branch of
government, legislative or judicial, is empowered to establish rules for
pleading practice and procedure in the courts. 45
II. COMMENTATORS AND THE SEARCH FOR
GENERAL THEORIES
A. Recognition of Mixed Roles
Many commentators welcomed the expanding role of the judiciary
in the rulemaking process, while others argued that a continued role
39. Id. at 749, 1079. See also Sydney v. Auburndale Constr. Corp., 96 Fla. 688, 689, 119 So.
128, 128-29 (1928) (stating Lhat the power to make its own rules for the conduct of its own
business is an inherent power of the court).
40. Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ill. 1952).
41. See Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859).
42. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1968).
43. See Means, supra note 35, at 444. See also William L. Earl, The Rule Making Power of
the Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone between Substance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 87
(1971).
44. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24; Means, supra note 35, at 444-52; Jeffrey A. Pamess,
The Legislative Roles in Florida's Judicial Rulemaking, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 359 (1981).
45. FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE
JUDICIARY 17 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullinex, Judicial Power and the Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L. REV.
733 (1995); Roscoe Pound, The Rulemaking Powers of the Court, 12 A.B.A. J. 599 (1926); John
20021
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for the legislature was essential.47 One commentator summarized the
arguments for and against judicial rulemaking as follows:
Reasons advanced supporting judicial rule making power include: (1)
judicial immunity from political pressures; (2) judicial interest,
expertise, and familiarity with procedural problems; (3) avoidance of
legislative delay to enact needed procedural changes; (4) public
expectation of judicial accountability for the efficient administration
of justice; (5) willingness to constantly review procedural methods;
(6) ability to make minor changes in individual rules without embark-
ing on wholesale procedural or judicial reform; (7) less cumbersome
enactment process; (8) decreased litigation resulting from application
of court-made rules over legislative codes because of legislative
inability to clarify ambiguity once rules are promulgated; and (9)
consistent interpretation of rules by the same body who created them.
In opposition, arguments advance favoring legislative rule-making
include: (1) judicial resistance to change; (2) judges' bias favoring
their own preferences; (3) judges who are out of touch with the needs
of litigants and members of the bar; (4) the perception that the legis-
lature better reflects the public will; and (5) concern that judicial rule-
making will restrict or create substantive rights.48
Even the authors that argue for concurrent roles for the judiciary
and the legislature in the area of procedural rulemaking recognize that
there are certain powers and functions which must remain within the
ultimate control of the court:
What the holdings do suggest is that there is a third realm of judicial
activity, neither substantive nor adjective law, a realm of "proceed-
ings which are so vital to the efficient functioning of a court as to be
beyond legislative power." This is the area of minimum functional
integrity of the courts, "what is essential to the existence, dignity and
functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal and from the very
fact that it is a court."
49
B. Florida Theories
Commentators in Florida who have supported greater legislative
involvement in the rulemaking process also recognize certain limitations
on legislative encroachment on the inherent authority of the judiciary:
H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L.
REV. 276 (1928).
47. See, e.g., Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 36, 42.
48. Dean, supra note 16, at 149-50 (citation omitted). See also Kenneth S. Gallant, Judicial
Rule Making, Absent Legislative Review; The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV.
447 (1985) (criticizing the theory that rulemaking can safely be entrusted to courts without fear
that they will invade the legislative domain).
49. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 31-32 (internal citations omitted).
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Finally, if concern over the possibility of legislative tampering is not
completely assuaged by such considerations, additional assurance
may be derived from the realization that the court could probably
continue to protect its procedures against legislative encroachment to
the extent supported by a limited claim of inherent rulemaking
authority. The Florida court has never been particularly aggressive in
claiming such authority, possibly because it has for so long been the
recipient of generous delegations of rulemaking authority, either by
statute or the constitution. However, the court has never completely
renounced it. Indeed, in the very opinion by which it disclaimed pos-
sessing the measure of inherent authority that would enable it to
adopt a wholesale revision of the rules of civil procedure in the face
of existing statutory regulations, the court also asserted that statutes
regulating procedure would not be respected by the court "if they
hamper the administration of justice."
To the extent, therefore, that a rule of the court related solely to the
orderly dispatch of judicial business and did not infringe upon,
change, or affect any substantive right, it would probably be held to
prevail over a conflicting statute. There would seem to be no more
than a theoretical threat to legitimate legislative authority in such a
minimal priority. 5°
The intent of this article is not to extensively enter into the fray
concerning the wisdom of legislative participation in the rulemaking
process. This topic has already received considerable attention.5 This
article will explore the extent of the judiciary's inherent powers and the
responsibility of the court to identify them.
C. Existence of Inherent Powers
The concept that courts have certain powers directly resulting from
their mere existence is not new. In 1928, the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin stated, "[C]ertain powers have been conceded, to courts, because
they are courts. Such powers have been conceded, because without
them they could neither maintain their dignity, transact their business,
nor accomplish the purpose of their existence. 52 Another strong early
statement of a court's inherent rulemaking power came from the Colo-
rado Supreme Court:
The judicial power of the state is vested in the courts; the legislative
and executive departments are expressly forbidden the right to exer-
cise it, and the courts, charged with the duty of exercising the judicial
power must necessarily possess the means with which to effectually
and expeditiously discharge the duty; this duty can be performed and
50. Means, supra note 35, at 484-85.
51. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 9; Dean, supra note 16, at 148, 170.
52. State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 603 (Wis. 1928).
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discharged in no other manner than through rules of procedure, and
consequently this court is charged with the power and duty of formu-
lating, promulgating, and enforcing such rules of procedure for the
trial of actions as it deems necessary and proper for performing its
constitutional functions.-
3
The court's inherent powers have been defined as those which are
necessary to "exercise its jurisdiction, administer justice, and preserve
its independence and integrity."54 The existence of such inherent pow-
ers has generally been accepted." The Texas Supreme Court stated that,
"The inherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative
grant or specific constitutional provisions, but from the very fact that the
court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain
duties and responsibilities."56 Even in those states where there is no
specific separation of powers provision within the state constitution it
has been recognized that certain core functions exist which may only be
performed by the judiciary.57
Moreover, it is revealing that some states have determined that the
judiciary has inherent powers regarding the operation of the court even
where the legislature is granted specific constitutional power to regulate
court procedure.58 Although, "section 30 of article VI of the New York
State Constitution grants the legislature the power to regulate the court's
powers and procedures and the legislature has broad regulatory control
over the Civil Court . . .," the court determined that certain basic inher-
ent powers flowed from the fact that, "[a]rticle VI section 1 of the New
York Constitution vests the judicial authority of the State in a unified
court system." 59
D. Theoretical Bases
There are "two primary theoretical basis for inherent judicial pow-
ers. The first is the separation of powers doctrine. The second is the
53. Kolkman v. People, 300 P. 575, 584-85 (Colo. 1931).
54. Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979).
55. See Dean, supra note 16, at 167 (agreeing that a court has inherent powers).
56. Eichelberger 582 S.W.2d at 398 (emphasis in original).
57. State ex rel. Friedrick v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 531 N.W.2d 32 (Wis. 1995); see
also People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602 (111. 1977) (making clear that the Illinois Supreme Court
had exclusive rulemaking powers in practice and procedure in matters involving the courts
notwithstanding that the Illinois constitution gave it no specific rulemaking powers over the
judiciary but that certain power flowed from its supervisory responsibilities).
58. See Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (finding statute granting
immediate trial to landowners if tenant failed to deposit post-petition rent or use and occupancy
violated principle of separation of powers by interfering with court's control of its own docket).
59. Id. at 912-13. In Lang, the court conducted a detailed analysis of the concept of
separation of powers and the existence of inherent judicial power. See id. at 913-14.
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power inherent in a court because of its sheer existence."6 The theories
are not mutually exclusive, however, and courts have utilized both doc-
trines in upholding the judiciary's exercise of a particular power or
invalidating an action of the legislative branch that intrudes on the inher-
ent powers of the court.6 ' Many times courts have stated that the exer-
cise of inherent powers do not require some specific constitutional basis;
therefore, the concept has also been referred to as "implied powers" or
"incidental powers. 6 2 These terms, however, are not synonymous with
inherent powers. There is a distinction between the two terms and inher-
ent powers.6 3 Inherent powers refer to the exercise of powers that are
reasonably necessary for the conduct of a court's constitutional func-
tions and that grow out of the court's jurisdiction. Implied powers are
those that arise out of and are necessary to carry out the authority
expressly granted and contemplated either constitutionally or
legislatively. 6'
E. Express and Implied Inherent Powers
Inherent powers may be expressed or implied. The fact that the
constitution expressly grants a particular power, does not mean that
power may be abrogated by deleting or amending the particular section
of the constitution granting that power. For instance, no one would seri-
ously argue that a constitutional amendment deleting the judiciary's
authority to oversee the bar would remove the power to regulate court-
room demeanor of attorneys through the utilization of contempt.
Also, inherent powers are not necessarily exclusive. Although
some functions are within the core powers of a branch of government
upon which other branches may not intrude,65 the vast majority fall in
the great borderland of shared authority.66 In some situations the power
of the legislature and the courts may overlap:
The law is well established with respect to evaluating challenges to
statutes whose constitutional infirmity is claimed to flow from imper-
missible intrusion upon the judicial power... Because the powers of
the three branches of government inevitably overlap, this court has
consistently held that the doctrine of the separation of powers cannot
be applied rigidly ... and has refused to find constitutional impropri-
60. STUMPF, supra note 45, at 6.
61. See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723 (Conn. 1974).
62. Friedrick, 531 N.W.2d. at 37.
63. State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 607 (Wis. 1928).
64. STUMPF, supra note 45, at 5. See also Raymond B. Mallard, Inherent Power of the Courts
of North Carolina, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 12 (1974).
65. Barland v. Eau Claire County, 575 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Wis. 1998) (discussing judiciary's
exclusive authority over supervision of judicial assistants).
66. Id.
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ety in a statute simply because it affects the judicial function.... A
statute violates the constitutional mandate for a separate judiciary
magistracy only if it represents an effort by the legislature to exercise
a power which lies exclusively under the control of the courts .... In
accordance with these principles, a two part inquiry has emerged to
evaluate the constitutionality of a statute that is alleged to violate sep-
aration of powers principles by impermissibly infringing on the judi-
cial authority .... A statute will be held unconstitutional on those
grounds if: (1) it governs subject matter that not only falls within the
judicial power, but also lies exclusively with judicial control; or (2) it
significantly interferes with the orderly functioning of the Superior
Court's judicial role.67
The court may, in fact, defer to the legislature's preference as
expressed in a statute while at the same time recognizing the judiciary's
ultimate control in an area.68 Therefore, some level of legislative over-
sight or participation is not necessarily repugnant to the concept of judi-
cial primacy. 69 Generally, however, it has been held that where the
legislature may take limited action in regard to a court's inherent power,
its actions may not unduly burden the operation of the court system.70
Thus, the idea enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court in Jackson, that
certain burdens placed on the court system may be so onerous that their
imposition by the legislature constitute a violation of separation of pow-
ers, is not unique to Florida.
F. Affirmative and Negative Inherent Powers
Inherent powers in the area of rulemaking may be viewed as both
affirmative and negative. In a number of states, the term "inherent
power" in the rulemaking context has been used in a negative manner to
invalidate legislative intrusion into the rulemaking realm of the judici-
ary. In some states where there is no specific provision in the constitu-
tion or in the statutes which authorizes judicial rulemaking, the doctrine
of inherent powers has been determined to be a specific power source.
Another example of the dual nature of this power is embodied in Felix F.
Stumpf s title of his book on inherent powers, Inherent Powers of the
Courts, Sword and Shield of the Judiciary.7
67. State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 672 (Conn. 1998) (internal citations and quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
68. In re Amendments to Rules of App. Proc. 685 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1996).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the
legislative branch could pass reasonable restrictions concerning court's inherent contempt
powers).
70. See State ex rel. Friedrick v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 531 N.W.2d 32, 37 (Wis.
1995).
71. STUMPF, supra note 45.
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G. The Scope of Separation of Powers
Unlike federal courts, the inherent powers of state courts are not
strictly tied to adjudicative functions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
specified that the court's rulemaking functions arise from both the sepa-
ration of powers provision as well as an ekpress grant within the state
constitution.72 The court rejected the argument that the separation of
powers provisions only applies to purely judicial functions and not to
rulemaking.73 Roscoe Pound stated, "the procedures of courts is some-
thing that belongs to the courts rather than to the legislature, whether we
look at the subject analytically or historically . . ." and "if anything was
received from England as a part of our institutions, it was the making of
.. . general rules of practice was a judicial function."74
H. Scope of Secondary Authority
Literature concerning the inherent authority of the judiciary is not
as sparse as asserted by Chemerinsky.7 5 Much of the literature on the
subject deals with either which entity should have ultimate control over
judicial practice and procedure76 or how far the court may go in exercis-
ing nontraditional court functions, such as budgeting, under the doctrine
of inherent powers.77 On the topic of how much of practice and proce-
dure may be considered to be within the inherent powers of the court,
however, there is a lack of uniformity and consistency of national deci-
sions, as well as a lack of literature which is national in scope. As
Stumpf stated, despite the extensive exercise of these inherent powers
"learned writers have described the concept as 'shadowy' and 'nebu-
lous' or as a problem of definition that has bedeviled and eluded many
courts and commentators for years. '"78
I. Lack of Uniformity: Constitutional Differences
and Other Factors
There are a number of reasons for the deficiency in uniformity and
72. See In Re 42 PA. C. S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1978) (rejecting the application of the
open public meeting laws to judicial rulemaking).
73. See id. at 449.
74. Pound, supra note 46, at 601.
75. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 139.
76. See STUMPF, supra note 45, at 19 (citing to a number of law reviews discussing the
interbranch conflict over the rulemaking power).
77. See, e.g., Howard B. Glaser, Wachlter v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 78
JUDICATURE 12 (1994); Ted Z. Robertson & Christa Brown, The Judiciary's Inherent Power To
Compel Funding: A Tale of Heating Stoves and Air Conditioners, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 864 (1988);
Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding and Inherent Judicial Powers,
52 MD. L. REV. 217 (1993); STUMPF, supra note 45, at 47-60 and cases cited therein.
78. STUMPF, supra note 45, at 1.
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guidance concerning how much procedural rulemaking is within the
scope of the judiciary's inherent powers. First, there has been no need
for the court to reach this issue because so many states grant the proce-
dural power through express constitutional provisions. Second, there
has been a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to create confrontations
with the legislature unless absolutely necessary. Third, by identifying
specific powers as inherent, there is an implication that these powers are
necessarily exclusive, an idea which is at odds with specific constitu-
tional provisions, historical background, and concerns raised by numer-
ous commentators regarding the proper role for the legislature in the
procedural rulemaking process. Fourth, state constitutional provisions
and judicial interpretations dealing with the separation of powers and
rulemaking provision are extremely varied. Fifth, by enumerating or
describing a particular type of rulemaking power that is inherent in the
judiciary, certain rulemaking responsibilities may be unintentionally
omitted from those later found necessary for the operation of an inde-
pendent judiciary. Sixth, there is a dearth of controlling authority or
guidance at the federal level. Finally, the problem in determining what
is procedural versus substantive renders the process of identifying that
part of the procedural functions that are also inherent in the judiciary
extremely difficult. In part, the issue of inherent rulemaking powers has
never received much attention because the authority to adopt rules for
the state judiciary has been granted by specific constitutional provision
or by statute. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Given the scope of the statutory grant, the issue as to whether the
Supreme Court's rule-making authority was inherent or whether it
stemmed solely from 17 P.S. §61 was never put to a conclusive test;
as long as the power was there, its source was not of great impor-
tance. And in 1968 this already somewhat dormant issue became
moot. It was in that year that the Judiciary Article of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution was altered to grant the Supreme Court in arti-
cle V, § 10(c) 'the power to prescribe the general rules governing,
practice, procedure and the conduct of all counts.' 7 9
Several state courts are granted the specific constitutional authority
to adopt rules of practice and procedure.80 In other states, such as Flor-
ida, courts have been given some level of control by statutory provi-
sions." Where this specific authority is granted, there has been little
need for the court to identify any portion of its general rulemaking
power as part of the inherent power of the court. Means reached the
79. See In re Pa. C. S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. 1978) (quoting PA. CONST. art. V.
§ 10(c)).
80. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
81. Means, supra note 35, at 445-46.
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same conclusion concerning Florida courts, stating that where courts are
given express powers, there is no need to aggressively pursue the con-
cept of inherent powers.82 Exercising or claiming powers that are not
expressly granted to the judiciary can subject a court to challenge and
criticism for overreaching.
Courts have been required to utilize the doctrine of inherent power
only in. situations where there is no expressed grant of power, or in
which the court is exercising functions not traditionally within the judi-
cial branch. Thus, many of the court decisions dealing with inherent
powers concern the affirmative exercise of powers that are
controversial.83
Similarly, it has also been difficult to create a uniform body of case
law because of the differences of language in state constitutions. The
variations in constitutional language may relate to those sections dealing
with separation of power or those sections which define the rulemaking
responsibility. Some state constitutions contain strict prohibitions
against one branch of government exercising powers of another. For
example, the Ohio Constitution specifically states in pertinent part that,
"[T]he general assembly shall (not) exercise any judicial power, not
herein expressly herein conferred . . .,,81 The Alabama Constitution
states "the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial power, or of either of them."85 Other constitutions more gener-
ally state that no member of one branch of government may exercise the
powers of another.86 On the other hand, some state constitutions contain
no specific language addressing separation of powers.87
The responsibilities for procedural rulemaking may also be
addressed in numerous ways by state constitutions. Levin and Amster-
dam recognized at least eleven variations in language concerning allo-
cating responsibilities between the legislature and the judiciary in this
area.88 Some state constitutions grant specific rulemaking authority to
the court and provide for no express legislative oversight or restriction
as to court rules.89 Other constitutions grant the state supreme court
general rulemaking powers over the practice and procedure and the con-
duct of all courts as long as they do not abridge, enlarge, or modify
82. Id. at 484.
83. Appropriation of sufficient resources to operate the courts is one area that has received
much attention. See supra note 77.
84. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1084 (Ohio 1999).
85. ALA. CONST. art. III, § 43.
86. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 3; Mo. CONST. art. II, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1.
87. New York's and Wisconsin's constitutions are two examples.
88. Levin & Armsterdam, supra note 24, at 6.
89. ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 1; Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5.
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substantive rights. 90 Yet other constitutions provide for some type of
legislative oversight, such as a veto power (usually not amendment
power), by an extraordinary role or action of the legislature.9 1 Still other
constitutions are silent as to specific rulemaking authority, but grant
general supervisory powers to the state supreme court.92 The Wyoming
Constitution even limits this power by adding the language, "as may be
proscribed by law." 93 Finally, section 6, article 30 of the New York
Constitution grants the legislature the power to adopt rules concerning
the court's power and procedures as well as giving it broad regulatory
control over the civil court.94
Even when dealing with similarly worded constitutional provisions,
the courts of the various states may construe them differently. In Flor-
ida, the Florida Supreme Court has said the separation of powers provi-
sions will be strictly construed. 95 The New Jersey Supreme Court,
however, has construed similar constitutional language in a more flexi-
ble manner:
The doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental to our State gov-
ernment. Article III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution spe-
cifically prohibits any one branch of government from exercising
powers belonging to a coordinate branch. Nevertheless, we have
always recognized that provisions of the State Constitution prohibit-
ing one branch of government from infringing on the power of the
other "requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative
accommodation among the three branches of government." Also, it
is well-settled that "a legislative enactment will not be declared void
unless its repugnancy to the Constitution is so manifest as to leave no
room for reasonable doubt." 9 6
In State v. Cotton,97 the Florida Supreme Court specifically rejected
the New Jersey flexible construction of separation of powers noting that
"[t]his Court, on the other hand, in construing the Florida constitution,
has traditionally applied a strict separation of powers doctrine. '"98
90. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
91. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20.
92. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
93. WYO. CONST., art. V, § 2.
94. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 30.
95. State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 353 (Fla. 2000).
96. Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs. EAJ, Inc. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 712 A.2d 180,
185 (N.J. 1998) (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932, 935-39
(Ariz. 1989) (stating that separation of powers did not require hermetically sealing off of one
department from another).
97. 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000).
98. Id. at 353. The court, however, recognized it was difficult to delineate a complete
separation of powers. Id. at 353. See also State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947, 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
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J. Avoiding Legislative Conflict
Another reason the courts usually rely on specific authority, rather
than inherent powers, is the desire not to unnecessarily create antago-
nism and confrontation with the legislature. The identification of an
implied area of judicial supremacy creates an atmosphere for potential
legislative backlash. Courts generally will affirmatively act to avoid
conflict. For example, after the Evidence Code was adopted by the Flor-
ida Legislature, the supreme court recognized that there were both sub-
stantive and procedural aspects to the code.99 The court it therefore
adopted the code to avoid potential confusion. 10
Dual adoption is only one mechanism for accomplishing peace
between the branches. Courts also avoid conflict with the legislature by
construing statutes so that they are compatible with court rules or by
deferring to the legislature in a limited area because of its expertise. 0 1
For instance, the Florida Supreme Court has deferred to the expertise of
the legislature in identifying certain time limitations. 102
Even in those cases where conflict arises, the court attempts to
accommodate the wishes of the legislature. For example in Allen v. But-
terworth, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted many sections of the
Death Penalty Reform Act.' 3 It refused to adopt, however, those provi-
sions which severely interfered with individual rights or which infringed
too deeply on the inherent powers of the court.0 4 In fact, nothing in the
constitution "precludes the judiciary from adopting legislative state-
ments or expressions of policy as part of the rules governing matters
within the jurisdiction of the judiciary."'' 0 5
Courts are also reluctant to utilize the doctrine of inherent power
because it calls into question participation by the legislature in the
99. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979), opinion clarified by 376 So. 2d
1161 (Fla. 1979).
100. Id. at 1369.
101. See St. Mary's Hosp. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2000) (interpreting automatic stay
provision in medical malpractice act so as not to conflict with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130 regarding stay pending review).
102. See, e.g., Kalway v. Singletary, 708 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1998) (holding that legislative
adoption of time periods for prisoners to bring certain types of actions did not violate separation of
powers).
103. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 65 (Fla. 2000).
104. Id. at 54. Another example in Florida is the evidence code which contained both
substantive and procedural aspects the court adopted in the case in order to incorporate the
procedural aspects and avoid confusion. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.
1979); see also In re Florida Evidence Code, 675 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1996). It was only when faced
with an invasion of individual rights that the court refused to adopt a portion of the code as
proposed by the legislature. See In re Amendment to Florida Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339 (Fla.
2000).
105. Florida Publ'g Co. v. State, 706 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
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rulemaking process. In a number of states, like Florida, the legislature
has some role in that process. 106 Commentators have argued that legis-
lative input is essential because procedural rulemaking, by necessity,
also affects the substantive rights of the parties. The need for legislative
review in these cases arises from the fact that these procedures are so
intimately related with substantive considerations that inherent in them
is the potential of frustrating policies. 107 If an area is determined to be
within the exclusive inherent power of an independent court system, it is
difficult to argue that any type of review by another branch of govern-
ment is permissible. 108 If, however, rulemaking is only a power that is
granted by specific constitutional language, then the constitution may
also describe the level of legislative participation. In turn, reliance on
specific constitutional authority provides legitimacy to legislative
participation.
Furthermore, courts may not wish to identify certain powers as
being inherent. This is because a specific enumeration of powers may
lead to the unintended exclusion of other, non-listed powers. This is
analogous to the rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.10 9 Thus, the potential for exclusion exists when a
court specifically enumerates inherent powers or attempts to describe
them by the use of criteria or categories. Thus, if a power did not fit
within a category or meet the designated criteria, then argument could be
made that it was not an inherent function of the judiciary. The issues of
applicability of federal case law and substantive versus procedural rules
are discussed in the next two sections.
III. LIMITED FEDERAL GUIDANCE
A. Federal Case Law
Federal case law does not provide an overall blueprint that states
may follow in these areas. In addition, federal courts have found that
state case law provides little guidance in resolving separation of power
issues in the federal court system." ' 0 The structure of the United States
Constitution, which gives Congress the power to create inferior federal
courts as well as the power to make laws "deemed necessary and proper
106. For example, in Florida the legislature may repeal judicially adopted rules of procedure
by a two-thirds vote of each house. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(b).
107. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 18.
108. See Dean, supra note 16, at 187 n.160 (citing to articles that argue that if rulemaking is an
inherent power exclusive to the judiciary, independent review of court promulgated rules is an
impossibility).
109. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403
(6th ed. abridged 1991).
110. See United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 697 n.9 (4th Cir. 1982).
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to execute those powers vested in Congress," differs markedly from the
provisions of state constitutions dealing with separation of powers.1 1
The federal constitution contains no specific separation of powers lan-
guage. As noted earlier, many state constitutions have very explicit lan-
guage forbidding one branch from performing the functions of another.
Additionally, the federal constitution does not provide guidance as
to what the judiciary's powers are. Article III's textual brevity, which
provides little guidance for court literalists as to the proper extent of
judicial authority, poses a distinct problem for courts deciding separation
of powers cases involving the judiciary. Unlike Article I and Article II,
which extensively delineate the powers of Congress and the executive
branch, Article III merely vests "judicial power" in the federal court.
Article III does not indicate what constitutes judicial power. 1 2 Ironi-
cally, state constitutions typically provide more insight into the nature of
judicial powers than the federal constitution.
B. Federal Interpretation
Separation of powers at the federal level has been interpreted
extremely narrowly. The focus has been on judicial independence as to
decision-making rather than determining those powers that are necessa-
rily part of the court system. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
echoes this limited focus. He found that Article III establishes three
safeguards of judicial independence: (1) tenure of office; (2) protection
against financial penalties; and (3) the rule (an implication of establish-
ing a "judicial power") that final judgment must be carried out."1 3 There
has also been a long standing recognition that Congress has the power to
prescribe rules of practice for the federal courts." 4 Under this analysis,
the Fourth Circuit refused to follow state case law and upheld a speedy
trial rule passed by Congress."I5
Additionally, federal courts may be distinguished from their state
counterparts because, unlike state courts, they are not common law
courts. " 6 The common law nature of state courts is important because
of the common law tradition that the details of legal procedure "for the
most part of Anglo-American legal history had been left to rules of
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 & 18. See also Brainer, 691 F.2d at 698.
112. Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1316 (1993).
113. See French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 448-53 (7th Cit. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
114. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 19
(1941).
115. United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695 (4th Cir. 1982).
116. Id. at 697 n.9.
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court."' l" 7 For these reasons, the less stringent separation of powers
interpretation at the federal level has not been considered binding upon
the state courts. 1 8 Thus, individual state courts are left to apply the
more stringent separation of powers provision of their own constitutions.
Nevertheless, federal law may be instructive in two respects: (1) pre-
scribing the outer limits of potential legislative intrusion; and (2) deter-
mining whether there is any particular class of rulemaking that is beyond
the scope of legislative enactment.
C. Vital Function
Consider, for example, that even absent strict separation of powers
language or a common law basis, there are inherent powers of the fed-
eral court that cannot be usurped. 119 This distinction is not based upon a
procedural versus substantive distinction, but on a realm of powers "so
vital to the efficient functioning of a court as to be beyond legislative
power."' 20
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,'2 ' the United States Supreme Court
identified a limited scope of inherent powers upon which Congress
could not tread. Article III of the United States Constitution gives the
courts the power to pronounce the law in a particular case or contro-
versy. That power is "not merely to rule on a case, but to decide them
conclusively, subject to review only by superior courts in Article III
hierarchy."' 22 Thus, a provision of the Securities and Exchange Act
requiring federal courts to reopen judgments unconstitutionally infringes
upon the constitutional powers of the federal courts. 2 3 The test for
impermissible infringement has been defined as whether a statute pre-
vents the judiciary from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.'24 While Congress can reasonably regulate contempt powers
of the court, it could not abrogate it or render them inoperative.' 25
D. Individual Constitutional Rights
There is also another class of rules created by the federal courts that
117. Pound, supra note 25, at 35.
118. See B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 991 (Fla. 1994).
119. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
120. Brainer, 691 F.2d, at 697. See also Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 31-32.
121. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
122. Id. at 219.
123. Id. at 225-26.
124. Brainer, 691 F.2d at 698.
125. See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co.,
266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (recognizing that the inherent power of federal courts to punish for
contempt is subject to regulation by Congress, provided such regulation neither "abrogates that
power, nor render[s] it practically inoperative").
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cannot be repealed, limited, or amended. These are rules based on the
protection of individual constitutional rights. In Dickerson v. United
States, the Court held that the Miranda warning, a prerequisite to the
admissibility of a statement made by the accused during custodial inter-
rogation, was constitutionally based, and could not be overruled by leg-
islative act.'" 6 Clearly, Congress cannot interfere with rules put in place
to protect rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.12 7  Presump-
tively, the same could be said for those rules adopted by state courts to
protect rights guaranteed by the state or federal constitution.12 8
IV. DEFINING THE PROCEDURAL
Uniform interpretation of inherent procedural powers has been
thwarted by the difficulty courts have had in defining what is procedural.
Courts have been befuddled by the task of differentiating the substantive
from the procedural. On a national level, it has been called "nigh-
impossible,"' 129 while in Florida, it has been called a "twilight zone."' 30
Substantive law is said to create and define legal rights with respect to
persons and their property. Practice and procedure may be described as
the legal machinery by which substantive law is made effective. 13' The
boundary, however, is imprecise. 32 It is therefore sometimes difficult
to distinguish whether a particular matter involves substance or proce-
dure, especially because a substantive right must be implemented
procedurally. 133
Making the task more difficult is that different states have taken
opposite positions on whether particular powers are procedural. For
instance, the Florida "Evidence Code" is both substantive and procedu-
ral in nature. 134 In North Dakota and Arizona, it has been described as
procedural. 35 The inability to reach consensus concerning what is pro-
cedural complicates the broader issue of which procedural powers are
also inherent powers.
126. 530 U.S. 428, 437-38 (2000).
127. Id. at 444.
128. See Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 544-45 (Fla. 1999) (determining that Florida
legislature could not interfere with the independent and inherent authority of the court to assess
effect of error on verdict where such assessment was grounded on constitutional principles).
129. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 14-15.
130. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (1972) (Adkins, J.,
concurring).
131. See Silver, supra note 36, at 276 and cases cited therein.
132. See Means, supra note 35, at 453.
133. Silver, supra note 36, at 277 (citations omitted).
134. In re Amendments to Florida Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 2000) ("[T]he
Florida Evidence Code is both substantive and procedural in nature .... ).
135. See Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125, 131 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel,
691 P.2d 678, 681-82 (Ariz. 1984).
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For the purpose of this article and for the purpose of identifying the
inherent powers of the court, it may be unnecessary to enter the quag-
mire of defining what is procedural. This is because the broader cate-
gory of potential inherent rulemaking powers may be identified by a
survey of the types of rules adopted by the courts under their authority to
regulate practice and procedure. Every state has rules governing prac-
tice and procedure within its courts. While those rules may differ by
title, they generally will cover many of the same areas. 136 The regula-
tion of practice will include codes of conduct for lawyers and judges.
There will usually be rules of judicial administration which may relate to
court records, court personnel, administrative matters, docket control,
and recusal of judges. Procedural rules may be adopted for all subject
areas of practice including: civil; family; criminal; probate; appellate;
and juvenile. Among other things, these rules may address: court fil-
ings; time limitations; form of pleadings; service of process; subpoenas;
discovery; court proceedings; jury selection; utilization of the contempt
powers; offers of judgment; entry and enforcement of judgment; and
extraordinary writs.
Because these various rules may have both substantive and proce-
dural aspects, it may be more productive to define the potential scope of
inherent court rulemaking in terms of those areas where the courts have
traditionally adopted rules. Any further artificial definition of procedu-
ral would be just as unworkable. As discussed earlier, the attempt to
draw this line proved to be a daunting task in Florida as well as on the
national level. 137
Attempting to define procedure may retain some importance if a
court found that the scope of inherent powers is coextensive with the
authority to adopt procedural rules. For a number of reasons discussed
later on, such a broad assertion of inherent authority may be both unwise
and unsupportable.
V. ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS APPROACHES
As stated earlier, it appears there are three options for the courts in
136. For instance, in Florida, there are have rules of court governing matters including: civil
procedure; judicial administration; criminal procedure; workers compensation procedure; probate;
traffic court; small claims; juvenile procedure; appellate procedure; mediation; court appointed
arbiters; regulation of court reporters; professional conduct of lawyers; and conduct of judges. See
FLORIDA RULES OF COURT (West 2000).
137. See generally Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 14-24 (exploring difficulties of
distinguishing between substance and procedure in order to determine the legislature's proper role
in rulemaking); see also Clinton A. Wright 111, Note, Confusion In Florida Offer of Judgment
Practice: Resolving the Conflict Between Judicial and Legislative Enactments, 43 FLA. L. REV. 35
(1991).
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determining the scope of inherent rulemaking powers that flow from
either the separation of powers provisions of state constitutions or from
the existence of an independent judiciary.
A. Poverty of No Inherent Powers Approach
Option number one, that a court has no inherent power outside what
is specifically granted within the constitution, is unsupportable as previ-
ously discussed. As such, there is no jurisdiction which has taken this
position. In New York and at the national level, where the legislative
branch has specific authority to adopt procedural rules, the courts have
recognized certain rulemaking powers which are within the inherent
powers of the court. 38 There has been no need for a specific constitu-
tional grant of rulemaking authority. These jurisdictions specifically
refute the extreme position that no inherent rulemaking power exists.
B. Complete Rulemaking Authority in the Courts
Option two, which has been adopted by several jurisdictions, is that
the entire area of rulemaking for practice and procedure is within the
province of the judiciary.'39 This position may have initial appeal as a
response to Chemerinsky's concern that court inaction leads to the
potential loss of due process rights, as well as promotes greater conflict
between the legislature and the judiciary. Arguably, this position also
avoids a second definitional problem regarding procedural versus sub-
stantive areas as the only issue that needs to be addressed is what area is
within the inherent power of the court. Further, this option would proba-
bly preclude a legislative attempt to regain primacy over rulemaking
powers. This position, however, may be unwise from a policy stand-
point and is probably legally and historically unsupportable in most
jurisdictions, including Florida.
As noted earlier, most courts have refrained from an over aggres-
sive assertion of inherent powers in part to avoid conflict between the
branches. Judicial restraint has also reflected the legislature's superior
ability to gather information within certain areas as well as an under-
standing that many procedural rules have substantive aspects better dealt
with by the legislature. These concerns all appear to be valid policy
considerations which would justify review of individual proposals on a
case by case basis.
The historical background also does not support exclusive judicial
138. See Part II.C. and III, supra.
139. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (N.M. 1976)
(indicating that the separation of powers provision of New Mexico's constitution was the basis for
the exclusive rulemaking function of the state supreme court).
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control over the entire area of rulemaking for practice and procedure.
The era of legislative domination in which the court only asserted lim-
ited authority based on inherent powers is inconsistent with the assertion
that the inherent powers of the court encompasses the entire rulemaking
field. Moreover, those jurisdictions still providing for legislative pri-
macy over rulemaking would also refute the assertion that control over
the entire area of procedural rulemaking is necessary for an independent
judicial branch. While this precedent is not necessarily controlling it
would appear to be persuasive. Additionally, many jurisdictions most
likely have specific authority, like Florida, have held that the entire area
of rulemaking is not within the scope of the inherent powers of the
court. 140
C. Partial Autonomy Over Rulemaking
Option three is that certain areas of rulemaking for practice and
procedure are within the inherent powers of the judiciary. This appears
to be the most viable and most legally supportable position and has been
adopted in the greatest number of jurisdictions. It specifically recog-
nizes the legitimate role of the legislature in the rulemaking process, as
well as providing the judiciary the most flexibility in dealing with inter-
branch conflict without invading the province of the legislature. Any
state selecting this alternative, however, must be aware of the potential
problems associated with the choice.
The recognition that certain procedural rules are outside the scope
of the court's inherent powers means that the legislature is not totally
precluded from attempting to usurp specific rulemaking authority from
the court. Defining the inherent powers of the court may prove as diffi-
cult and problematic as differentiating the procedural from the substan-
tive. Without a bright line rule defining inherent powers, conflict with
the legislature should be expected. Further, the courts would be required
to review individual cases to determine whether the legislature substan-
tially interfered with the court's ability to perform its essential functions.
Stronger court opinions relating to the inherent rights of courts are
essential. There must be a greater recognition that the manner in which
inherent rights are identified is critical. More concrete definitions or
workable criteria for identification of substantive versus procedural rules
will result in less potential conflict with the legislature. A brief survey
of national and Florida cases regarding inherent powers may be useful in
establishing a workable method of identification.
140. But see Sydney v. Auburndale Constr. Corp., 96 Fla. 688, 119 So. 128 (1928) (rejecting
this position).
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D. Nationwide Examples of Inherent Power
The best, albeit dated, compilation of inherent powers at a national
level is Stumpf's book on inherent powers. 4' The rulemaking process
would seem to fall within Stumpf's category of inherent authority con-
cerning "court governance."' 112 He stated that courts have the authority
"to regulate and conduct their internal affairs and to prescribe rules and
conditions of the oversight of those persons who are or become actors in
the activities related to the judicial process." '143
The oversight of persons who are part of the judicial process has
generally been accepted to be within the realm of judicial control.
Courts have thus determined that they have the inherent power to adopt
rules of conduct for judges, lawyers, and other court personnel."' This
oversight authority is one of the reasons that regulation of contempt is
within the court's inherent powers. The power of contempt is vital to
the judiciary in maintaining order and controlling the courtroom. The
contempt power is also essential to the court's enforcement of orders
and final judgments. Therefore, other branches of government cannot
pass regulations dictating to judges when and how to exercise their con-
tempt powers.145
Other areas, especially those related to the manner in which pretrial
and trial matters are to be handled, exist where courts should exercise
rulemaking authority. Stumpf recognized that trial courts are uniformly
found to have inherent powers "so that the adjudicative process can
141. STUMPF, supra note 45, at 81-105.
142. Id. at 15.
143. Id. at 16.
144. As to conduct of judges, see, e.g., Weinstock v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1999)
(determining that statue involving disqualification of judges violated the separation of powers
provisions of the state constitution). In re Kading, 235 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1975) (holding that
Wisconsin Supreme Court has inherent authority to adopt Code of Judicial Conduct including a
specific rule requiring the filing of annual financial statements); As to attorneys, see, e.g., In re
Edwards, 266 P. 665 (Idaho 1928) (holding that Idaho Supreme Court has inherent power to adopt
rules and regulations prescribing qualifications of persons seeking to practice law); Turner v.
Kentucky Bar Assoc., 980 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1998) (holding that statute authorizing non-lawyer to
represent parties in workers' compensation proceedings violated constitutional principles of
separation of powers); Belmont v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 511 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1974) (holding
that judicial branch has inherent power to prescribe and administer rules for licensing and
admitting lawyers); Ruben, supra note 34, at 114. As to regulating conduct of other court
personnel, see, e.g., L.J.S. v. State Ethics Comm'n, 744 A.2d 798 (Pa. 2000) (determining that it
was a violation of separation of powers for state ethics commission to discipline judicial
assistant); State v. Meadows, 454 S.E.2d 65 (W.Va. 1994) (holding that judiciary has authority to
control conduct of bailiffs).
145. See Murneigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357 (Il. 1997); see also Ex parte Barnett, 600
S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980) (holding that court has inherent power to punish party refusing to
obey court order).
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function" where rules and statutes are silent. 14 6 Where the legislature
has spoken, however, the authority is less clear. Statutes dealing with
specific conduct within the courtroom would also violate the separation
of powers' provision by intruding on the inherent power of the court.' 47
A number of courts have held inherent powers existed to regulate
items relating to procedure, such as time limitations, where and what to
file, discovery, case management, and entry and enforceability of final
judgments. 4 8 Some courts have even gone so far as to say that the judi-
ciary has the inherent power to control all practice and procedure.
149
Others, as previously mentioned, have determined that the evidence
code should be adopted by court rule.' 50 Some courts have determined
that the responsibility for setting time limits to file appeals is within the
inherent powers of the judiciary. '' But generally, statutes of limitations
are set by the legislature 52 and certain time limits set by the legislature
for posttrial proceedings have been upheld. 53
E. Inherent Powers in Florida
The inherent powers of Florida courts have generally been defined
very broadly: "All courts in Florida possess the inherent powers to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of their jurisdiction, subject to valid existing laws and
constitutional provisions."'' 54
The Supreme Court of Florida applied this definition to the inherent
power to adopt rules, stating: "It is well established that courts of justice
have the inherent power to prescribe such rules of practice, such rules to
regulate their proceedings and such rules to facilitate the administration
146. See STUMPF, supra note 45, at 37.
147. State v. LaFrance, 471 A.2d 340 (N.H. 1983) (holding that statute allowing law
enforcement officials to wear firearms in courtroom is an unconstitutional violation of separation
of powers because trial judges have inherent power to control courtroom proceedings).
148. For a full survey on the inherent powers of the court, state by state, see STUMPF, supra
note 45, at 81-106.
149. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1358 (N.M. 1976).
150. See Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1339-40 (Miss. 1989).
151. See Metcalf v. Altermeller, 369 N.E.2d 498 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977) (noting that Illinois
Supreme Court had authority to adopt rules for limiting the time for taking appeals); State v.
Connery, 661 P.2d 1298 (Nev. 1983) (holding judicially created that rule of criminal procedure
superseded statute concerning time for filing appeals); Kitties v. Rocky Mt. Recovery, Inc., I P.3d
1220 (Wy. 2000) (determining that statute limiting time period for filing appeals from county
court was unconstitutional as it was in conflict with Wyoming Supreme Court rule).
152. See Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993).
153. See, e.g., Le v. State, 953 P.2d 52 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (holding legislature may
define scope of postconviction relief without violating separation of powers provisions).
154. State v. Ford, 626 So. 2d 1338, 1345 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Roger A. Silver, The Inherent
Powers of the Florida Courts, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257 (1985)).
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of justice as they deem necessary." 155 More recent cases have dealt with
regulating court filings 56 and exercising the power of contempt.5 7
Two authors have attempted to comprehensively identify the spe-
cific inherent powers of Florida courts. Burris attempts to describe
inherent powers in terms of broad subject matters which are within the
inherent powers of the court. 58  Of the fourteen powers he identifies,
those which are specifically related to rulemaking are: (1) regulation of
the legal profession; (2) establishment of rules of practice and procedure
for the courts; (3) control of the judiciary duties of the clerk or deputy
clerk; (4) contempt powers; (5) access to court records; and (6) waiver
of immunity for judicial and quasi judicial officers. 159  Several of the
other broad categories identified by Burris involve adjudicative powers
of the court, such as the interpretation of contracts and determining the
constitutionality of a statute.160
A law review article by Silver identifies a litany of actions which
were within the inherent powers of the court. 6  He first identifies five
categories where the Florida legislature and the court have disputes
involving separation of powers. These categories include: (1) the power
to admit defendants to bail pending appeal; (2) the power to require
presentence investigation; (3) the power to immunize attorneys from dis-
ciplinary proceedings; (4) the power to determine when an action is con-
sidered commenced; and (5) the right to determine the appropriateness
of joinder and severance. 162 Silver then identifies forty-five examples of
the court's inherent powers where there is no substantial separation of
powers dispute between the court and the legislature. 63
155. In re Jacksonville Bar Ass'n, 125 Fla. 175, 177, 169 So. 674, 675 (1936).
156. See Basse v. State, 740 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1999).
157. See, e.g., Acosta v. Creative Group Invs., Inc., 756 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
158. Johnny C. Burris, The Administrative Process and Constitutional Principles: Separation
of Powers, 74 FLA. B. J. 28, 32 (2000).
159. See id. at 32.
160. See id.
161. See generally Silver, supra note 36.
162. See id. at 282-85.
163. See id. at 286-89. Silver states:
The Florida courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt, to determine
their own jurisdiction, to enforce judgments, to enforce collection of judgments, to
vacate judgments, to set aside satisfaction ofjudgments, to appoint process servers,
to appoint co-counsel to represent insolvent criminal defendants, to change venue
when deemed necessary to secure a fair trial, to instruct jury on maximum and
minimum penalties in a criminal trial, to direct a verdict of not guilty and to set
aside a jury verdict in a criminal trial, to appoint an acting state attorney, to dismiss
an action for failure to prosecute, to impose the sanction of dismissal for failure to
comply with a court order, to impose the sanction of dismissal as a coercive
measure, to strike a voluntary dismissal, to dismiss an appeal, to dismiss or decline
jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, to revoke
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While this list is somewhat helpful, it fails to be dispositive con-
cerning which of these powers are inherent to the court and which can-
not be subject to over-intrusion by the legislature for two reasons. First,
the analysis in many of these cases is based on a specific set of facts
rather than the court's authority to adopt a general set of rules. Second,
there has been no attempt by the legislature to regulate many of these
specific areas, so there is no analysis concerning the extent of legislative
involvement which would be appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION: CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING INHERENT POWERS
In determining what is an inherent power, the most important anal-
ysis is whether a proposal directly affects a core function of the court.
The next issue that must be analyzed is how directly and how severely
the proposed rule affects the court's ability to perform the function. The
more that legislative intrusion is directly related to a core function of the
court, the more likely the court will invoke the doctrine of inherent
powers. 164
The core functions of a court are: (1) protection of constitutional
rights; (2) determination of controversies between parties, including
construing constitutional and statutory provisions; and (3) enforcement
of final judgments.
Thus, "[t]he invocation of the doctrine is most compelling when the
judicial function at issue is the safeguarding of constitutional rights."'' 65
The courts will even enjoin legislative actions in areas identified as both
substantive and procedural where it infringes the protection of constitu-
tional rights. 66 Furthermore, while Florida courts have let the legisla-
probation, to seal court records, to revoke the probate of a will, to correct errors, to
reform written instruments, to re-establish court records, to modify and clarify court
orders, to award attorney's fees against an attorney in correcting a scrivener's error
in a final judgment, to enter judgments nunc pro tunc, to impose dress requirements,
to require judicial consent for the withdrawal of attorneys, to prohibit future pro se
appearances in court, to protect minor children, to entertain matters pertaining to
child custody, to award exclusive occupancy of a marital home in divorce
proceedings, to award temporary relief, to prevent abuse of judicial procedure, to
exclude the testimony of expert witnesses, to issue writs of ne exeat, to control the
conduct of proceedings, to protect a defendant in a criminal trial from inherently
prejudicial influences that threaten fairness, to preserve order and decorum in the
courtroom, to guarantee to litigants the fundamental right to a fair trial, and
generally to further the administration of justice.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
164. See Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
165. Id. at 137.
166. See In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 2000)
(refusing to adopt amendment to evidence code which unconstitutionally violated a defendant's
right to confrontation).
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ture set the time period for bringing civil writs,'6 7 the supreme court
would not give the same deference to the legislature for setting time
periods for collateral challenges to criminal convictions, such as writs of
habeas corpus, which are grounded in individual constitutional rights.'68
While all three of the criteria are related to the decision making
process, it would be a mistake to believe that a court's inherent powers
are strictly adjudicative. 69 A court's authority is not limited to adjudi-
cation, but includes certain ancillary functions, such as rulemaking and
judicial administration which are essential if the courts are to carry out
their constitutional mandate.170 The Massachusetts Supreme Court has
similarly stated the judicial function extends beyond the determination
of questions in controversy and includes functions incidental to the adju-
dication role.' 7
In weighing those items that are not strictly within the adjudicative
powers of the court, one must look at a number of criteria which can be
gleaned from case law cited within this article:
(1) Items directly related to the conduct of persons who are major
actors in the adjudicative process will usually be considered to be
within the exclusive province of the judiciary.
(2) Regulation of judiciary personnel will generally be considered to
be within the exclusive province of the judiciary.
(3) Control of court records will generally be considered to be within
the exclusive province of the judiciary.
The other items one must look at are: (1) how severely the intrusion
affects the operation of the court; (2) the extent that the item involves
substantive considerations; (3) traditionally who has exercised the func-
tion or power which is at issue; and (4) any other public policy concerns
related to the particular issue. Other criteria should be identified by the
state judiciary.
I began this article believing (similar to the thoughts expressed by
Chemerinsky) that, in order to preserve an independent judiciary and
due process rights, it was essential for the courts to more aggressively
define those powers which are inherent to an independent judiciary.
There also seemed to be a lack of uniform body of case law and litera-
ture to guide the legislature, the courts, and practitioners concerning
inherent powers. I was even inclined to believe that in light of threats
from the legislature that the courts should draw a bright line rule, that all
167. Kalway v. Singletary, 708 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1998).
168. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52, 61 (Fla. 2000).
169. See Matters of Salary of the Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163, 169 (Wash. 1976).
170. O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Mass. 1972).
171. Id.
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rulemaking concerning practice and procedure was within the scope of
the inherent powers of the court.
For reasons expressed herein, I have come to believe that only cer-
tain of the rulemaking powers can be considered to be within the inher-
ent powers of the court. In addition, the legislature should retain the
present veto power if the court intrudes on substantive issues. Unfortu-
nately, this position will inevitably lead to future conflicts with the
legislature.
The court, therefore, should take certain steps which will ultimately
lead to a more solid framework. First, the court should specifically iden-
tify when legislative action unduly burdens the court's inherent power.
Reliance solely on the specific constitutional rulemaking authority, with-
out the assertion of inherent authority, may avoid immediate contro-
versy, but this position provides little guidance for the legislature and
the public concerning the scope of the court's inherent powers.
Second, the court needs to better define what are inherent powers
and specifically lay out the criteria to be used in identifying when these
powers exist. Better identification of inherent powers will provide gui-
dance to both the legislature and the court so the possibility of conflict is
lessened. There appears to be little likelihood the federal courts will
provide this guidance. It is therefore necessary for the state courts to
issue comprehensive decisions concerning the court's inherent rulemak-
ing powers.
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